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Kathryn McNeilly, Human Rights and Radical Social Transformation: Futurity, Alterity, Power 
(Routledge, 2018), ISBN 9781138690219, 166 pages. 
 
Costas Douzinas once wrote that  
[h]uman rights are the negative principle at the heart of the social imaginary. The 
end of human rights, like that of natural law, is the promise of the "not yet," of the 
indeterminacy of existential self-creation against the fear of uncertainty and the 
inauthentic certainties of the present. When the apologists of pragmatism 
pronounce the end of ideology, of history or utopia, they do not mark the triumph 
of human rights; on the contrary, they bring human rights to an end. The end of 
human rights comes when they lose their utopian end.1  
 
Kathryn McNeilly’s book, Human Rights and Radical Social Transformation: Futurity, Alterity, 
Power,2 offers extended reflection upon the "not yet" of human rights and its promise for radical 
politics—a promise, which like the utopian end explored by Douzinas, is a restless, impossible 
principle of hope.3 McNeilly constructs an account of human rights emphasizing the persistence 
and significance of their not yet—a performative, agonistic leaning-forwardness—in which 
human rights are to be understood as a ceaseless grappling with the political, expressed through 
ineradicable tensions between power, vulnerability and alterity.  
In making her argument, McNeilly draws upon established critical engagements with the 
multiple paradoxes of human rights. She is fully aware that human rights ascendancy is marked 
by their extensive violation, by ambivalent dynamics between their emancipatory impulses and 
their dark complicities with hegemonic power. McNeilly understands, therefore, the skepticism 
of activists and thinkers concerning human rights. Her central question is animated by a deep 
recognition of human rights failures in full cognizance of their uneasy role in relation to 
contemporary crises—including the contemporary crisis of human rights legitimacy: Can human 
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rights, despite all this, "offer possibilities for contemporary radical politics?" This is a question 
that can only be answered adequately by examining the "relationship between human rights and 
radical social transformation" under present configurations of power.4 McNeilly’s book reaches 
out to battle weary activists and thinkers to make the case that human rights can be a vehicle for 
radical politics in confrontation with the hegemony of contemporary power:  
I advance that an alternative conception of rights compatible with the promotion 
of different regimes of class, gendered, racial, ablest and heteronormative power 
and meaningful social equality is made possible through the concept of "human 
rights to come."5 
Human rights to come, then, is in essence McNeilly’s account of the not yet of human rights. She 
offers an extended engagement with the "futurity" that Douzinas sees human rights "inscribe 
[into] law"6 by focusing her attention on the inherent futurity of human rights themselves. There 
is a way, McNeilly insists, for human rights to offer hope of renewed critical engagement and to 
recover the vital energies of their inherently political nature. Indeed, it is the very 
"depoliticization" (following Ranciere)7 of rights as a result of their widespread codification and 
positivization, converging with radical politics having "[run] out of tools to meaningfully 
challenge hegemonic regimes of power,"8 that opens out the promise and urgency of human 
rights to come. The power of human rights as a language of claim, combined with reclamation of 
their political nature and the responsiveness of human rights to crisis, suggests that a futural 
conception of human rights can reinvigorate the power of the political for contemporary politics.9  
McNeilly develops her thesis by beginning with the idea, well established in critical 
human rights thinking, that human rights always contain a movement of (re)articulation, that 
their meanings remain persistently open (Chapter 2). This dynamic of permanent excess means 
that human rights are always "inherently 'to come,' and . . . strive towards a futural conception of 
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living and being that is free from alterity."10  
McNeilly posits an interlocking set of four theoretical aspects of human rights to come: 
performativity (Chapter 3), universality as universalization (Chapter 4), agonistic pluralism 
(Chapter 5) and the paradoxical vulnerable subject (Chapter 6). She then unfolds "translation" as 
a core mode of practice for human rights to come (Chapter 7) before applying her analysis to a 
reconsideration of feminist approaches to human rights (Chapter 8). Finally, she offers a "non-
conclusion," emphasizing that the conception of human rights to come is but the beginning of a 
conversation (Chapter 9). 
The first of McNeilly’s theoretical aspects emphasizes a performative "(re)doing" of 
rights (Chapter 3) as "a dynamic and generative doing that works to bring the content of rights, 
and the subjects who claim them, into being."11 This means that human rights are to be 
understood not as juridical objects,12 but as a politico-legal activity. McNeilly argues that human 
rights must be understood not only as performative, but as "a performative doing in futurity"13—
human rights must be understood as ceaselessly open carriers of the not yet that never arrives—
and equally, as an unending critical performative activity. 
The second theoretical aspect involves the reconceptualization of universality as 
"universalization"—which is the universality distinctive to human rights to come (Chapter 4). 
This focus on universalization as process is necessary, of course, if McNeilly is to remain 
theoretically consistent with her emphasis on the futural performativity of human rights. 
Universality, like human rights themselves, is thus always not yet. Here, again, McNeilly returns 
to alterity—arguing that "human rights to come encourages an understanding of universality as 
an ongoing process of universalisation which aims to rid the universal of alterity."14 This, then, is 
the universalizing dynamic of human rights as a tool for radical critique and politics, exposing 
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and freeing human rights from the alterity erected by settled notions of their content and subject.  
Next, McNeilly argues that human rights to come turn away from the predominant 
presentation of human rights progress as consensus building, and towards rights as "characterised 
by conflict," (Chapter 5), arguing that  
[i]t is only when conflict and its ineradicable place in the politics of human rights 
is embraced that the radical possibilities of human rights can be pursued in terms 
of sustaining a futural conception of rights which is never settled, never fully 
within grasp and thus facilitates ongoing critical engagements with power.15  
To explore and defend this move, McNeilly turns to agonistic pluralism and, in particular, 
to Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe’s agonism, McNeilly explains, turns upon the idea that every identity 
is the "determination of an 'other' that is going to play the role of a 'constitutive outside'."16 The 
"we/they" relationalities thus constructed exist as "legitimate adversaries" within a commonality 
of commitment to the pluralistic, democratic space within which their conflict takes place—and 
"the task of democracy is to transform antagonism into agonism."17 McNeilly argues that not 
only is Mouffe’s agonism useful for conceptualizing human rights to come, but that human rights 
to come supplements Mouffe’s work by providing a rights-based component of agonistic 
democratic relations.18 Foregrounding "conflict" as central to rights and enabling participants to 
engage in the politics of human rights as "adversaries conflicting on what human rights mean and 
how current concepts relate to relations of power"19 is key to the transformation of human rights 
for a wider radical politics.  
It is at this point that an important ambiguity emerges in McNeilly’s thesis. At a couple 
of points earlier in her book, some readers might have been led by her wording to think that 
McNeilly believes in the possibility of freedom from alterity. The centrality of futurity, 
performativity and agonism to McNeilly’s account strongly suggests otherwise: McNeilly’s 
5 
freedom from alterity is futural—part of the not yet—akin to the impossible but necessary 
utopianism of human rights delineated by Douzinas. There is, however, a genuine ambiguity 
concerning alterity arising from the reliance placed upon Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism.  
Mouffe argues that "an adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom 
we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality."20 McNeilly endorses this position, arguing 
that human rights to come would transfer this legitimate adversarialism to ongoing disputes 
concerning human rights meanings.21 Yet Mouffe’s legitimate adversary—transposed into 
human rights—seems to operate, on the face of it, against the radical ambit of freedom from 
alterity by erecting a limit beyond which human rights politics will not recognize a human being 
as a legitimate adversary. If so, human rights to come are rendered a potentially less radical 
response to the alterity of human beings per se, narrowing the ambit of a futural politics of rights 
to include only those with either shared or alternative conceptions of rights, rather than those 
rejecting rights entirely. If this were to be the case, human rights to come would exhibit a core 
paradox similar to that expressed by international human rights law’s unsettling gap between 
"the citizen" and the human being "as such."22 
McNeilly never addresses the possibility that reliance on Mouffe might suggest limits of 
a human rights agon confined to those who share a framework for conflicts concerning human 
rights and their disputed meanings. This ambiguity is important, however, because if McNeilly 
imports Mouffe in this way, the impetus towards freedom from alterity in human rights to come 
may not be so much a human rights aspiration as a democratic rights aspiration.  
 In Chapter 6, McNeilly considers the ontology of human rights by exploring the 
paradoxical relationship between sovereignty and vulnerability in the human rights subject. She 
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suggests that this relationship provides her with two opportunities: first, to deploy the 
vulnerability of the "paradoxical subject . . . as a source of critical engagement with alterity and 
power in the politics of human rights,"23 and second, to foreground vulnerability as "a source for 
resistant action."24 McNeilly’s account is energized here by the important critical claim that not 
all people experience universal vulnerability in the same way—a claim producing "an attention 
to marginalization and suffering . . . and challeng[ing] . . . how power operates to lead to 
differential experiences of vulnerability."25  
There is a radically universalizing potentiality in vulnerability as a critical tool—one with 
the potential—I think—to reach past the ambiguity of human rights to come as a form of 
agonistic democratic construct. This potential is present in McNeilly’s argument that human 
rights to come draw attention to "the particular conditions of vulnerability that various subjects 
face, foregrounding this particularity within the context of a critical relation to alterity and 
power."26 However, the ambiguity persists, because McNeilly seems—again—to locate human 
rights to come within a distinctively democratic agonistic pluralism: human rights activism 
should take the form of "opening to the other . . . acknowledging the demands of the other made 
upon the self through democratic processes which also may open possibilities for enhanced pain 
or suffering."27 What then, of the practice of human rights to come? 
In Chapter 7, McNeilly turns to this important question. She again foregrounds the 
iterative performativity of human rights, locating human rights activism and practice in the idea 
of "translation" as "an activity that is fundamentally disruptive of the dominant and futural in 
nature, foregrounding a critical relation to alterity and power."28 McNeilly emphasizes the 
importance of shifting the practice of rights translation towards the overtly critical—and towards 
engagement in important (postcolonial) questions of power and resistance of dominant regimes 
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and conceptions.29 The "to come" of human rights is central to human rights as translational 
practice—and McNeilly re-emphasizes human rights to come as an agonistic process "whereby 
all share a commitment to the values that human rights represent, but promote translational 
contest over the specific form these values take in particular locations and contexts based on a 
critical relation to alterity."30  
McNeilly also argues that Butler’s cultural translation31 (which she draws upon) 
"visibilises the alterity within the dominant [universal as] norm and thereby 'exposes the failure 
of the norm to effect the universal reach for which it stands.'"32 Perhaps here, in the 
universalizing futural horizon of a visualized alterity, the radicalism of human rights to come as 
praxis might press beyond the limits of the agon. This possibility is present in the fact that 
human rights translations are never final; conceptions of the universal can never be allowed 
triumphant rest. In this sense, translation insists that, as Douzinas puts it, the justice of human 
rights "will always lie in an open future"—expressing "the energy of freedom in the service of 
our ethical responsibility for the other."33 The radicalism of translation is further emphasized by 
McNeilly’s deployment of postcolonial critique. When she argues that the role of translators 
should be seen as resisting the "idea that the practice of human rights [is] ever . . . closed or 
finished,"  McNeilly comes close to touching upon the materio-semiotic energies of human 
rights that always overspill—overspill the limits of democracy; overspill definitions of polity, 
nation and even existing designations of humanity itself—to reach out and touch, with outraged 
compassion, the suffering of human beings as such. 
In Chapter 8, McNeilly turns to a re-reading of feminist engagements with rights through 
the lens of human rights to come. She draws together the various theoretical aspects of her work 
to offer a "right to gender flourishing" as a concept addressing the limitations of feminist human 
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rights work, while pointing towards future feminist engagements with human rights to come.34 
Finally, in Chapter 9, McNeilly offers her "non-conclusion": the relationship between 
human rights to come and the potential for radical social transformation is always driven by the 
energies of the not yet. It is this not yet, the dynamism of which moves within and between the 
four main theoretical aspects of human rights to come and which is operationalized through 
translation, that holds out the hope of re-approaching human rights in the service of radical 
politics, to "advance the claims of those on the margins and critique, as opposed to reify, 
restrictive regimes of power." 35  
The non-conclusion of human rights to come, McNeilly argues, sustains rich possibilities 
for thinkers and activists. First, such non-conclusory human rights make explicit, and maintain, 
the need for ongoing resistance, critique and future-facing work. In addition, a non-conclusory 
human rights facilitates reflexivity—human rights to come are always "viewed as contingent and 
responsive."36 Third, this non-conclusiveness can move human rights and their politics "away 
from the structures and thinkabilities of law"—auguring a human rights politics "opened up to 
unpredictable new possibilities . . . [exceeding] their current order and articulation within law 
and legal structures."37  
There are also, however, challenges arising from this very same non-conclusion—not 
least that the futural nature of human rights to come can appear exhausting, involves uncertainty 
and risk,38 and "the agonistic contest which characterizes rights politics is an uncontrollable 
process . . . [reflecting] the wider uncontrollable nature of democracy itself."39 The risks, though, 
are unavoidable if the challenging political work of human rights to come is to be done.  
Finally, McNeilly assures us that her work is also just a beginning, just as the "non-
conclusion of human rights to come must be grasped as not an ending, but just another 
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beginning."40 Questions remain. There is much ground to be explored.41 This ground, I suggest, 
includes the haunting relationship between democracy and human rights that is never entirely 
resolved in this invigorating book. 
 Taken together, McNeilly’s fourfold theoretical aspects combined with the practice of 
translation point towards a stimulating framework for future human rights thinking and 
engagement. The productive ambiguity concerning the relationship between human rights and 
democracy—and the inherently unpredictable power of non-conclusory human rights to come to 
move beyond—point to a rich seam of future theorization. At points, the reader may find that the 
argument moves a little too rapidly—there are moments where a more detailed exploration of 
how human rights to come move beyond existing critical work would be welcome, but as 
McNeilly herself points out, her book is an opening contribution in an ongoing and important 
theoretical conversation. McNeilly’s thoughtful, imaginative, well-informed portrayal of the 
endless, restless processes of iteration at the heart of human rights and the contestable 
performativities that jostle for concretization beneath the surface of human rights as usual is 
more than welcome. This book carves out a thought provoking space in which the futurity of 
human rights might inform a renewing rights politics.  
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